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  Territorial appointees to an independent central bank (e.g. 
District Federal Reserve Banks’ presidents, Governors of national 
central banks at the ECB’s Governing Council) are liable to 
confront a “role conflict” stemming from a duality of loyalties 
and allegiances - to the home regional territory to which they 
owe the appointment and to the central bank to which they are 
appointed. This essay examines the issue of two “principals” for 
a given “agent”, within the framework of a “common agency” model 
in European monetary policymaking.  
 
  Territorial appointees cannot afford being unresponsive to 
their country-specific monetary preferences – as dictated by 
idiosyncratic social and economic structures, political 
orientations, cultural factors, and other determinants. Local 
preferences may conflict with the central bank’s mandated 
objectives, its social and political environment, the 
constellation of institutions gravitating in its orbit, which 
shape a given mindset and culture to which the territorial 
appointees are also prone to conform. 
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  I contend that territorial appointees to an independent 
central bank are prone to a duality of loyalties and allegiances 
– to the home actors and institutions to which they owe the 
appointment and to the central bank to which they are appointed. 
The analysis builds upon information on regional participation in 
national central banking, as that of district Federal Reserve 
Banks sitting at the FOMC, which underpins the arguments 
foreshadowing an issue of that sort for the ECB.  
 
  Home-specific monetary preferences are liable to conflict with 
the central bank’s area-wide policy. A uniform targeted inflation 
rate cannot be optimum to each and every territories involved as 
business cycles are not necessarily synchronous throughout the 
monetary area; sector concentration, territorial magnitudes, 
financial market volumes, political orientations, diverge also 
from mean values. Factors like the outcome of demand or supply 
shocks, local performances, endowments, social and economic 
structures and institutions, accrued seignorage, inflation-
aversion patterns and other cultural factors often show 
substantial diversity across countries or regions and are a 
magnet for time-consistent adaptation of inflation rates. Further 
diverging preferences stem also from the inhibiting fiscal 
limitations of the “European Stability and Growth Pact”, as well 
as from the absence of significant fiscal stabilizers and a poor 
rate of labor mobility in Europe.  
 
  Discordant or different time-frame preferences reverberate on 
territorial appointees. For all the independent status from their 
home countries or regions the appointees are institutionally 
granted, they are organically prone to wheedle the web of 
national policy-makers, institutions, and networks (the “core 
executive” – see note 
1), particularly so as they have 
participated in their appointment. These factors contribute to 
the make a territorial appointee an “agent” of his/her home 
country and be delegated critical duties in the monetary area. 
 
  However, the “agency” qualification is also applicable to 
his/her relations with the central bank. Central bank’s social 
and political environment, its formal instruments and mandated 
objectives, a constellation of institutions gravitating in its 
orbit (particularly its closeness to the financial community), 
the historical determinants of the central banking 
decentralization process, a peculiar culture, mystique, and 
inertia, may transcend the scope and purposes for which the bank 
was created. The central bank delegates on them the task of 
whipping up support for its agenda to their respective countries 
and expects them to make choices attuned to its institutional 
mandates, inflation control objectives, a stifling international 
environment and the relative inefficiency of monetary measures 
over unemployment and output variations, except short term. This National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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environment shapes a given mindset to which the territorial 
appointee is inevitably prone to conform, while at the same time 
he/she is divested from home and political affiliations. 
 
  One “agent” with two “principals”: the setting of a “common 
agency” and “role conflict” models is thus in place. The models 
(and plain common sense) predict the weakening of the principals’ 
power of incentives, the distortion of the information 
transmitted to the principals, and a subdued accountability to 
either of them. Muted commitments grant a larger leeway to the 
appointees’ own personal preferences and motivations in 
policymaking. There is then a potential incentive to cheat (so to 
speak) on conveying home country preferences (with the alleged 
reason of orthodox, long-term, non-partisan, benevolent welfare 
philosophy) – and a parallel incentive to cheat on central 
banking preferences (because of a better knowledge of home 
problems, intimidation, or absence of it, by the majority council 
members, a sense of interdependence among them). These personal 
and institutional constraints may explain the split of 
territorial appointees between the “activists” and the “free 
riders” – and seriously challenge at the same time the concept of 
a Rogoff-type
2 central banker, lesser vulnerable to political 
influences but fully devoted to collective well-being. In either 
group, the organizational and rentier context in which the 
appointees are embedded, their personal social, political, 
academic backgrounds and convictions, would then be given more 
prominence in monetary decision-making than that generally 
recognized in the current debate over monetary policy and its 
determinants.  
 
  Further empirical or theoretical speculations on that subject 
should not neglect this aspect of policymaking. To predict the 
European governors’ behavior in light of national experiences in 
the U.S. or elsewhere has not been the aim of this paper. The aim 
is rather to anticipate a “role conflict”, whose ingredients are 
similar in the national and multinational peculiar context of 
interests, political and social environment involved in monetary 
policymaking - and to outline its possible outcome.  
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Summary of sections 1 and 2 
 
The original version of this paper included a first section with 
an outline of actual or potential sources of conflict between 
individual regions or territories and central monetary 
authorities. Conflicts are apt to breed pressures on national 
central banks by the affected territorial entities and their 
respective political bodies, economic sectors and the society at 
large.  
 
The conflict exacerbates in poorer and depressed regions or 
nations, where debt load is generally greater than the average, 
in relative or absolute terms, and the increased debt service 
that tight monetary policy brings about puts an additional burden 
to local economies. More than this: the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effects predict higher inflation rates in the 
relatively weak economies that have rapidly tried to catch up to 
the average – namely, those showing stronger growth than 
countries where growth had already reached higher levels. This 
effect may well be felt in EMU region, where levels of national 
development are uneven. To be sure, growth patterns result in a 
strong demand expansion on non-tradable goods and services, while 
the productivity in those areas grows at slower pace than that of 
tradable products. This structural inflation difference, if met 
by ECB’s tighter monetary policy, would conflict with the 
interests of stronger economies.  
 
A further source of potential disagreement across territorial 
entities stems from the idiosyncratic time lags before monetary 
decisions affect the economies concerned. Money-transmission 
mechanisms or differences in responses to policy-induced interest 
rate changes show indeed significant territorial variations 
(deHaan, Toolsema, Sturm (2001); Kuttner, Mosser (2002)). 
Asynchronic productivity developments and national money demand 
functions disparities suggest also that area-wide money policy 
will also fail to accommodate individual national preferences 
(Dedola, Gaiotti, Silipo (2000)).  
 
Basically, optimality of monetary policy underlies a concern for 
local inflation/employment proportions when they differ from 
average values. To the extent that monetary measures are thought 
to correct those proportions, at least short term, and bring 
about lower social and economic costs, conflicting views with the 
monetary authorities may be expected. More generally, the 
optimality of monetary policy and its effects on 
inflation/unemployment combinations have been associated with 
three factors: 1. The “optimum currency areas” concept (Mundell, 
1963); 2. The territorial, often diverse, anti-inflation culture 
and public consensus on monetary stability; and 3. The political 
preferences and electoral constraints of local governments.  
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Section 1 of the original paper provides some analysis of those 
different issues, including the role of sectors geographically 
concentrated, and their breakdown into tradable and non tradable 
commodities, manufactures, and services is different. Either the 
production structure is homogeneous with that of the rest of the 
area or widely diversified or costs derived from those conflicts 
are bound to be important. Other factors contributing to costs 
are lack of a suitable degree of factor mobility and a deficient 
extent of trade among the countries, as well as flexibility of 
wages and prices, so that the need for relative price adjustments 
are met by movement in domestic prices rather than exchange rate 
movements or unemployment (Tootell (1990); Chamie, DeSerres, 
Lalonde (1994)).  
 
Heterogeneous cultural and political features across regions 
aggravate the effects of inadequate “optimal currency area” 
conditions and bear also on distinctive preferences over a 
possible trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Hayo 
(1998)). The importance of these features is particularly 
relevant where historical backgrounds manifest themselves in 
differentiated languages. Taste differences and anti-inflationary 
attitudes, stemming from cultural and historical profiles, are 
potential sources of conflict between individual countries and 
the Eurosystem.  
 
Different market and institutional frameworks may also influence 
social stress with a resulting disagreement over the optimality 
of monetary measures and preferences. Local traditions in respect 
of saving and investment patterns and styles; attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship, and other social and political circumstances 
also differ across regions and dictate region-specific monetary 
inclinations and preferences. Even differential crime rates, the 
scope of social welfare institutions and their unemployment 
insurance schemes, the extended family networks in Southern 
Europe, are also factors weighting on preferences over 
unemployment and inflation and on implications on monetary policy 
stances (Bentolila, Ichino (2000); Tullio, Quarella (1999)).  
 
Territorial ruling parties are committed to distinctive monetary 
orientations. The American experience bears out this opinion. The 
two parties in the United States have shown different preferences 
over inflation and unemployment which reflect those of the 




A second section of the original version of this paper assumes 
that the vulnerability of the bank to external pressures and in 
particular its resistance to claims channeled through the 
appointed members to its governing body hinges to a large extent 
on the bank’s personality, authority, commitments and constrains 
– as shaped by its social and political environment. The central 
bank’s formal instruments and mandated objectives are also National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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relevant indeed (Issing (1999); Andrews (2000)). However, 
important as these instruments are in the definition of their 
authority, structure, and personality, they do not account for 
the whole complex elements underlying the monetary policymaking. 
A constellation of institutions gravitating around its contested 
terrain have largely shaped the central banking structural, 
organic environment and its “agenda” – its style, purposes, 
objectives, strategies and even semantics (Epstein (1992); 
Bowles, White (1994)). The combination of these elements has 
contributed to create a central bank’s environment all its own 
which is bound to modulate the margins of decision of the 
governing members and even to make them “agents” of sorts of the 
bank (next section).  
 
Professional reputation has contributed to central banks’ aura of 
‘soundness’ and public service” and to a favorable environment. 
“An aggregation of expertise, its control over information, its 
privileged links with important constituencies such as domestic 
financial and business leaders or international financial 
agencies, its influence in the corridors of government, the 
connections of its key officials” are innate attributes of 
central banking.  
 
Three additional elements are explored in section 2 to explain 
the environment of an independent central bank and the extent to 
which it shapes its agenda. The environment has first to be found 
in the historical determinants of the central bank’s 
decentralization process. A credible, fancied interpretation of 
the decentralization process and its underlying forces and 
interests is that the process has been an instrument for co-
opting and absorbing peripheral forces (regions, sectors) into 
the central banking system so as to neutralize their potential 
hostility by incorporating them within the organization 
structure. (Broz (1997, 1999); Friedman, Schwartz (1963); Lohmann 
(1998); Woolley (1984)). A Byzantine question on this matter is 
whether the process permitted special-interest and territorial 
groups to be just listened to in the formulation of the central 
bank’s agenda – or has the process been promoted by interest 
groups, sectors and territories and let them in this way to shape 
the central bank’s agenda?  
 
The second point involves the closeness of the central banking 
environment with the financial community and other special 
interests groups. The commercial banking sector, in particular, 
maintains  strong organic linkages with central banks and wield 
reasonable power over them. In fact, influences are both ways. To 
the extend that financial structures and markets have 
increasingly spread to reach national dimensions – in terms of 
geography and financial deepening - regional separations of the 
banking sector have dwindled and so have been their individual 
regional (district) specificity. This argument may have an 
important bearing on the European context – just replace regions 
by nations, national by multinational - at a time when the National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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financial sector is transnational and increasingly ignores 
national borders. 
 
The question of a peculiar central banking culture, mystique, and 
the inertia that are common to groups (section 3) is also to be 
reckoned as elements of a central banking environment and 
assertiveness, which transcend the scope and purposes for which 
it was devised. A similar opinion arises in respect of the 
influences of academic circles – I mean, the intellectual and 
bureaucratic comfort provided by sticking to highly regarded 
theoretical models implying a set of rules, hence narrowing 
margins of discretionary powers and stifling national initiatives 
(Mayer (1999); Grenville (2001)). National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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3. The “common agency” issue 
 
  Section 2 suggests that the functions of territorial 
policymakers in an “independent” central bank are generally 
performed in a context of institutional, social, and political 
environment that has gradually shaped statutory, operational, and 
organic features. That environment in turn is apt to mold the 
appointees’ loyalties and commitments. I also contend (section 1) 
that the appointees’ are also committed (implicitly or not) to 
the interests, constrains and conditions of their home 
territories and their respective administrations. A conflict of 
interests or “role conflict” would then arise as monetary 
preferences do not necessarily coincide. This section examines 
the interaction of either “principal” in the policy behavior 
adopted by their common “agent”. (A short reference of recent 
formal analysis of interactions between national macroeconomic 
players and the ECB Council is included in note 
3). 
 
 (i) The home country’s agent.  
  
  The crucial role of monetary policy in national agendas makes 
the appointment of the country’s central banker a central issue 
in the government’s strategy and electoral planning. The 
government (principal) has an incentive to induce its central 
banker (agent) to be responsive to its preferences and electoral 
constrains – and so it will be to the extent that the agent 
shares the principal’s basic political and social agenda and 
expects it to come forward with adequate rewards, such as 
reappointment, post-central bank employment opportunities, 
political positions in the “core executive” circles, avoidance of 
public criticism, and other perks.  
 
  Some authors contend that the kind of dependence thus 
established leads the central banker to create a socially 
inefficient inflation bias by accommodating the political stances 
of the current administration. However, for all the possible 
incentives, a basic postulate is that the “agent” generally holds 
different views on optimal measures and that he/she is apt to 
stick to low-inflation pre-committed plans and to abstain from 
time-inconsistent opportunism which the government is inclined 
to. Divergences may result from personal political or 
intellectual outlooks, time frame and professional skills over 
monetary preferences. In fact, divergences of this kind are 
welcome as a solution to the inflation bias characterizing 
discretionary policies resulting from political or electoral 
motivations. (Alesina and Grilli, already in 1992, found striking 
political disagreement between the median voter in the EC 
countries and the Brussels policymakers (see note 
4). Both the 
government (or core executive, or public opinion) and its agent 
consider unemployment, output gaps, inflation, as evil outcomes 
of monetary disorders, but to the extent that, in the short term, 
a trade-off exists among them and monetary measures aimed at National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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alleviating one of them aggravate the other, the question of 
minimizing the global cost arises. In formal terms, both the 
government and the central banker minimize a quadratic loss 
function of policy targets. The respective individual preferences 
are shown as weights that the various bodies place on these 




  However, not only preferences diverge but also the 
determinants of the respective loss functions may be biased or 
falsified by incomplete or asymmetric crucial information, which 
is assumed to be better known by the policymaker than by the 
government
2. The assumption here is that the former has an 
informational advantage over the central government and that 
there is no way for the central government to extract the 
information acquired by its central banker. This assumption, 
quite common in the standard literature on decentralization 
(Laffont, Zantman (2002)), is particularly manifested when 
delegation is only partial, i.e. when the agency problems are 
managed not with incentive contracts but by keeping the 
government/principal involved in the decision process, that is, 
by limiting delegation (Marino, Matsusaka (2001)). The key 
tradeoff is that delegation allows the principal to reject those 
projects he dislikes, but causes the agent to distort the 
information he transmits to the principal. In particular, only 
the agent knows information which determines the principal’s 
optimal action, while the principal may not have a clear idea of 
what it or its constituency calls for as an optimum outcome of 
monetary policy. This involves a moral hazard when the principal 
is not able to stipulate nor directly observe, nor prove breach 
of action. (This issue and its conflicting derivations have been 
aptly portrayed in rational political economy models, as that set 
out in the Barro-Gordon’s social loss function. See note 
5). 
 
  Particular institutional designs are said to ease the problem 
of divergent preferences and asymmetric information between the 
central banker and its core executive. Fratianni et al.(1997) 
argue that the central banker’s personal independence from the 
government or performance-oriented compensation packages can 
achieve both optimal stabilization and the elimination of the 
inflation bias, and thus alleviate the negative outcome of power 
delegation on monetary matters. The degree of independence of the 
central banker from the appointing institution permits the agent 
 
1 For an analysis of suboptimal stabilization policies of Rogoff-type, 
conservative central bankers, motivating the request for formal 
accountability mechanisms, see Castellani (2002). The author perceives 
accountability as a desirable feature of monetary institutions and 
focus her reflection on the means to achieve it. 
 
2 “Each additional piece of relevant information [the central banker] 
reviews may reduce the uncertainty that policy makers face”. (Gary H. 
Stern, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). 
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to integrate his/her own preferences in policy making or to 
maximize a weighted sum of the principal’s objectives and his/her 
own. But the main ingredients of the agency issue subsist or 
become more relevant to the extent that the agent still relies on 
the principal for incentives and reappointment or when other 
elements of subordination are at work.  
 
  In this respect, Fatum’s (2002) theoretical game model 
considers the possibility of an appointee being concerned with 
policy outcomes that differ from the preferences of his/her 
government. Divergences are nonetheless designated only as a 
disguised means to achieving the government’s policy goals - 
depending on the preferences of the other delegates. The 
speculation is that the appointing government choosing its 
preferred delegate with a “Rogoff-central banker profile” would 
not permit a necessary “manipulation” of the council’s monetary 
policy decision towards a better policy outcome from the 
perspective of member state.  
 
  Drazen (2000) has also investigated the possibility of a 
government appointing deliberately a national central banker 
whose objectives are different from its own as a means to achieve 
what it considers an optimal objective. The relation between the 
principal and the agent is chosen by the principal to maximize 
its expected utility. If anything goes wrong, the principal may 
attribute failure to the agent’s incompetence or sabotage 
(including the possibility that he/she is actually behaving as 
the subordinate for someone else) or from unforeseeable exogenous 
shocks. “The key insight is that the government may find it 
optimal to act strategically when faced with agents who also act 
strategically”. The more accommodating monetary policy that the 
electorate may be calling for in given circumstances will only be 
avoided, as a sub-optimal medium-term measure, without the 
government reputation being tarnished, by delegating authority to 
a conservative central banker. (A reference to Drazen’s and other 
relevant analysis on this subject is included in note 
6). 
 
  The above has been the subject of profuse analysis in national 
central banking frameworks. Projecting the determinants of the 
national conflict thus analyzed to the ECB as a supranational 
monetary and political structure may not be an idle exercise - 
for all the ambiguity that apparent similarities may entail. The 
governors of the twelve national central banks (NCBs), together 
with the members of the Executive Board
3, are members of the 
Governing Council, the highest decision making authority in the 
 
3 Members of the Executive Board are to be “appointed from among persons 
of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or 
banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member 
States at the level of the Heads of State or Government, on a 
recommendation from the Council after it has consulted the European 
Parliament and the Governing Council. Their term of office shall be 
eight years and shall not be renewable” (article 11 of the Statutes). 
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ECB system (article 10 of the Statute). All members have 
obviously the national identity of one of the ECB’s member 
countries, while NCB’s Governors explicitly carry the affiliation 
of their country of origin. NCB’s Governors thus perform two 
distinct functions, at a national and at a multinational levels. 
As national governors, they have control over a complex 
organization involved in a variety of tasks, including the 
coordination and execution of the directives stemming from 
Frankfort, to which they provide experience and logistics, the 
operational aspects of monetary policy, open market operations, 
administration of the minimum reserve system, and management of 
the standing facilities. (More than half of the ECB’s staff have 
been recruited from NCBs, a fact that sheds additional light to 
the duality of the governors’ functions). While functions related 
to the determination of monetary policy rest with ECB, heads of 
NCBs making the bulk of its governing body continue to be 
organically integrated in their home institution and remain 
therefore an integral part of national administrations.  
 
  Integration to, or independence from, the national 
administrations is then key to what it may be speculated over the 
heads of NCBs as their country’s agents to the ECB’s governing 
body. The modalities of such independence, as laid down in 
national legislations, procedures, and traditions, the 
appointment systems, their terms of office, and the various 
institutions that integrate the “core executive” participating in 
the selection and appointment of candidates are main factors 
determining binding relationships and delegation of duties 
between governments and their central bankers. Appointment 
modalities differ across the twelve Euro-area countries, but it 
is widely recognized that in all of them the government is 
directly involved in the decisions. (See note 
7). 
 
  The agency and subordination problem becomes more complex as 
the government itself is held accountable to still other 
superiors (e.g., the parliament, the unions, the media, specific 
financial sectors and other special-interests groups) and tries 
to accommodate the interests and preferences of its own alongside 
to those on whom it relies for reelection or approval. A similar 
issue of identification of “superiors” of independent banks has 
been addressed in national contexts. In the U.S., for example, 
Woolley (1984, ibid.) attempted to discern “Who is the 
superior?”. “It is not entirely clear who is or should be the 
Federal Reserve's superior. Who should be giving orders to the 
Federal Reserve? Does the independence formula mean that no one 
should do so? Who does give orders? The president? Congress? 
Economists? Bankers?”. And he rightly concludes: “Asking who the 
superior is means asking whose preferences count”. (Additional 
quotations are included in note 
8). 
 
  Now, whatever the influence of the “principal” over its 
“agent”, it may be expected that it is going to be felt when 
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warrant. These conditions surely underpin the political and 
electoral incentives that prompt national governments to induce 
their “agent” to adopt selected decisions at the ECB’s boardroom. 
Severe unemployment rates in the home country or idiosyncratic 
shocks would enhance the incentives. And obviously the political 
and financial weight of individual members will be a further 
important incentive to pressure their representatives at 
Frankfort. Given the strong economic interdependence across the 
area, representatives of major countries may be tempted to push 
their national case as a remedy that will spill over the whole 
area. One may speculate on other elements apt to setting off 
pressures. Commitments taken by governments to trade votes within 
the EU system, with a potential for decisions in the monetary 
field, cannot be dismissed. To these incentives should be added 
the appointee’s own awareness of their better knowledge and 
experience of the nature and intensity of his/her territory’s 
problems than those elsewhere in the Euro-zone.  
  
  All in all, therefore, reasonable speculations on difficulties 
arising to the appointees being indifferent to their core 
executive or government’s policy guidelines. “The issue is not 
that bank presidents take or solicit direct instructions from 
their patrons, but whether they are cloned and then sent on their 
mission. When an issue of difference arises, a French appointee 
would vote in the style of France, and a German, as predictably, 
in the way of the Bundesbank.” (Dornbusch, Favero, Giavazzi 
(1998). Apparently, this is not an empty gossip but an opinion 
borne out by empirical analysis. Meade and Sheets (2002) find 
that “the majority of ECB Council members typically voted on 
monetary policy changes in a manner that can be justified by the 
differential between their national inflation rate and the EMU 
average”. Confirmation of the data would then suggest that 
national appointees consider their local interests or biases at 
least as much as the bank’s agenda in deciding on the single 
monetary policy. 
 
  Information on the U.S. system also suggests regional 
influences and inputs being integrated in policy decisions more 
than current literature admits. Not all consider this as a 
positive feature but a factor to be taken as inevitable in a 
context of the peculiar system that aims at ensuring a balance of 
powers. Everyone at the governing councils is committed to 
defending the currency - a commitment which would entail a common 
outlook and uniform approaches to policy measures - and yet “the 
regional representation of Bank presidents in the formulation of 
FOMC policy … (does) not attempt to maximize social welfare but 
rather are seemingly influenced by the narrow and shortsighted 
interests of their primary constituency”.  
 
  Analysis of responses of presidents of district federal 
reserve banks to specific regional shocks with unpleasant effects 
(unemployment, mainly) has identified some critical periods 
across the nation - and how crisis have manifested themselves National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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among the various regions in terms of unemployment. For the 
period 1978-1980 the cross-sectional variance of state 
unemployment, in percentage points, grew from 2 to 3 percent; the 
period 1981-1983 reached 7 percent; in 1986, the increase was 
from 3.8 to 5.5 percentage points. Around 1991-1991, the figure 
went up from 1.6 to 2.8. The corresponding percentages of 
variance were compared to the dissenting votes at FOMC. Gildea 
(1992) concludes: "Federal Reserve policymakers would like to be 
viewed as objective independent expert technicians who decide 
monetary policy issues in the country's best interest.  Many 
recent studies have questioned this description and have provided 
considerable evidence to the contrary”. (See note 
9 on Gildea’s 
and other analysis). 
 
  The above analysis calls for some qualifications. First, votes 
on monetary policy, assenting or not, may not be taken as an 
unfailing signal or measure of policy’s positions and 
responsiveness to individual home conditions, as voting may 
underlie coalitions, compromises or commitments which are meant 
to only be cashed at a later state or engage further planned 
action - decisions on voting may be an ambiguous response to a 
reciprocity constraint. Reciprocity gambling or vote trading – 
the agent’s commitment to giving support of demands of 
counterparts in the future in exchange for similar concessions 
he/she receives from them today - may also mute or erase 
individual regional action insofar as this permits to elude any 
future constraint when demands will be put forward by other board 




  Second, it would also be wrong to take regional unemployment 
or output gaps as the only regional parameters apt to spur voting 
action by a regional representative. For regions with a high 
concentration of tradable goods and services industries, monetary 
measures bearing on exchange rates are also given high 
priorities.  
  
  Back to the European central banking system: The Growth and 
Stability Pact, imposing virtually automatic penalties on member 
states running budget deficits above 3 per cent, may exacerbate 
pressures on the appointee. Commitment to fiscal austerity is a 
political obstacle to dealing with rising unemployment during a 
recession through the existing structures of welfare states. 
These constrains may induce the governments to put larger 
emphasis on expansionary monetary policy; corresponding pressures 
to their central banker may be forthcoming, with concomitant 
threats of penalties or rewards.  
 
 
(ii) The central bank’s agent. 
 
“While serving on the FOMC, I was vividly reminded of a few things 
all of us probably know about committees: that they laboriously 
aggregate individual preferences; that they need to be led; that 
they tend to adopt compromise positions on difficult questions; and National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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- perhaps because of all of the above - that they tend to be 
inertial. Had Newton served on more faculty committees at Cambridge, 
his first law of motion might have read: A decision-making body at 
rest or in motion tends to stay at rest or in motion in the same 
direction unless acted upon by an outside force”.  
Alan Blinder (1998).  
 
  The U.S. pattern of delegation of duties by the Federal 
Reserve System and its Chairman to FOMC members puts some 
perspective on related developments unfolding in the European 
context. (Some basic facts are included in note 
11). Functions 
assigned to those territorial appointees embody a number of 
delegation of duties and agency features. First, territorial 
appointees participate in the definition and implementation of a 
monetary policy whose mandated objectives are clearly specified 
and for which they will be held accountable (to their peers, to 
the financial community, and other interests beyond their home 
constituency). The publication of minutes and records of FOMC 
formal meetings, provides an ostensible responsibility for policy 
decisions and opinions expressed at these meetings (a feature not 
replicated in the European system). Second, appointees are given 
an unambiguous role a communication link between their respective 
territories (U.S. districts) and the central banking structures. 
Third, they are conspicuously divested from their home district 
and political affiliation to be fully incorporated in the central 
administration apparatus. Fourth, while they are elected by their 
local (district) boards, they are effectively appointed by the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, which can thereby exercise a 
veto – something which does not exist in the European system.  
 
  Whether regional or national, U.S. or Europe, territorial 
appointees are integrated in the central banking apparatus and 
are (collectively or not) held responsible for the attainment of 
the bank’s objectives
4. Substantial differences, however, do not 
permit drawing outright parallels with the European context. ECB 
has not come into being from the socio-political context as that 
of the national central banks examined in this paper; its organic 
and bureaucratic structures are not identical; its international 
environment is not similar; its appointment prerogatives are not 
comparable. All in all, FOMC regional members are not the sort of 
(regional) central bankers that are their (national) ECB 
counterparts. ECB is deprived from a main attribute of the 
“principal” concept enjoyed by the Federal Reserve: the command 
over appointments of members of the governing body, with which to 
penalize or reward them and as an incentive to make those members 
abide by its preferences. Unlike their European counterparts, the 
territories that peripheral appointees are meant to represent in 
the United States do not coincide with single political entities 
(nations enjoying a large level of political autonomy). The 
 
4 “We are collectively accountable and not individually accountable”, 
says Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a member of the ECB’s Governing Council 
(and of its Executive Board). (“The Region”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, December 2001). Collective accountability severs links 
with home countries and helps explain why the bank does not publish 
voting records of the meetings of its Governing Council. National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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dissociation between the district geography and the state 
political territories and constituencies deprives the 
representative of a U.S. central bank district the political 
weight and backing enjoyed by European governors and does not 
allow for a more assertive, region-oriented action. In the U.S., 
in addition, social divisions and feelings of alienation are much 
less correlated with geography than are European countries.  
 
  At the same time, the Euroland may face a much more serious 
problem of territorial pressures than do national central banks 
in respect of those stemming from regional territories. ECB’s 
members exhibit strong national loyalties, sovereignties, 
languages, and powerful histories of rivalries and independence, 
thus making it easier to organize national pressure groups than 
it is for the regional ones in a country like the U.S. where 
those who want to bring pressure on the central bank are able to 
work not necessarily through the states, but through economic and 
social special-interest groups, such as labor unions and 
Washington sectoral lobbies. 
 
  For all the dissimilarities, however, the ECB may be sharing 
with national monetary institutions three additional factors - 
also relevant to the agency issue: The bank’s institutional 
independence; the political fragility of the independent status, 
particularly when manifested in bank’s bashing by aggrieved 
territories and interests, with a resulting solidarity among 
council members; a particular central bank culture; and the 
influence of academic theoretical models in monetary policy.  
 
  First, the institutional independence of the bank and its 
organs from national member countries, together with the accepted 
commitments on objectives, provide the appointees with the 
incentives to assume some degree of subordination to the bank and 
to take upon themselves its delegated duties. Independence is 
reflected in the obligation imposed to appointees to act in a 
fully independent personal capacity, and not as national 
representatives – and corroborated by the principle “one person, 
one vote” (Eijffinger and J. De Haan (2000)). The provision is 
considered as a necessary condition for achieving the bank’s 
primary objective (price stability) – thus ruling out “short-term 
considerations of a political nature”, says René Smits (…). “When 
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, 
neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any members of 
their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from 
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member 
State or from any other body. The Community institutions and 
bodies and governments of the Member States undertake to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the 
decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central 
banks in the performance of their tasks. (Articles 105 and 107 
and Article 7 ESCB Statute).”  
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  “The provision on central bank independence works in two ways: 
it impresses upon the entities composing the System and on the 
members of its decision-making bodies not to seek or take any 
instructions from any body and it enjoins the Community 
institutions and bodies and Member States’ Governments to refrain 
from seeking to influence the members of the System’s decision-
making bodies”. Note that when this provision is not met to a 
satisfactory extent, concerned ECB Council members do not fail to 
point the finger at the culprits.
5 
  
  The absence of publication of the minutes and voting records 
of the Governing Council provides the anonymity that shields the 
appointees from accusations that could be levied by their home 
countries if their decisions ran counter the national 
preferences. Anonymity on votes is expressly provided for in the 
Treaty as a means to ensure the independence of the appointees 
and prevent pressures from their home authorities – a legacy from 
the Bundesbank, contrary to that featured in the U.S. system. 
 
  Second, the fragility of the bank’s independence status and 
the absence of political control enhance the risk of disruption 
when one or several member countries are stung by asymmetric 
shocks or feel otherwise neglected in monetary policymaking. 
Indeed, the Bank’s independent status is under constant threats 
by countries or governments which may feel affected by the bank’s 
policies and strategies. It can be assumed that vulnerability to 
these threats stirs a move of solidarity and esprit de corps by 
all the actors concerned with the independence of the bank and 
glosses over their internal differences. Whatever their political 
or territorial origin, all members will feel committed to 
solidarity and consensus as a way to avoid in particular any 




  This issue brings to mind the fact that “independent” central 
banks have nurtured their status by a highly political behavior 
and an active cultivation of their autonomy. “The ECB would not 
be wise to rely exclusively and passively on its protected status 
 
5 As reported by Reuters (International Herald Tribune, June 15-16, 
2002) “Nout Wellink, a member of the European Central Bank council, 
said large European countries tend to vote in their national interest 
in the bank’s policy-making council, questioning the official line that 
ECB decisions are reached by consensus rather than by vote. His 
comments also contradicted the bank’s stance that national interest 
should play no role in rate decisions, which are taken in the interest 
of the 12-nation euro zone as a whole”. 
 
6 Precedents of national central banking political strategies in this 
line of thinking are plentiful. “The Bundesbank knows that it can 
endanger the legitimacy of its independent status if it quarrels 
publicly with popular elected officials; in one case its resistance to 
the popular policies of a chancellor ended with the resignation of the 
Bundesbank president”. Lohmann, Susanne (1988). 
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in EU law, in the treaties and the statute, but will have to 
cultivate this constituency as adroitly as the U.S. Federal 
Reserve and the Bundesbank have done”
7. Who else better than the 
national appointees to be delegated the task of keeping alive in 
their respective countries the esteem of the bank’s monetary 
measures and protect in this way the latter’s independence. And 
not only this. The argument developed in this paper is that a 
depressed country can see the Frankfort central bank as an 
instrument for a more accommodative monetary stance; its 
appointee is mandated to broker a move in this direction. 
However, first, the instrument can only work as long as it keeps 
its independence from governments and other pressure groups. 
Central bank independence stems mainly from historical successes 
in meeting commitments towards currency stability, a commitment 
adhered to by the society and respected by governments. So that 
pressures upon the bank by a territorial appointee, if ever 
pressures were feasible and enough bargaining power was available 
to him/her, will probably not be stretched to the point that the 
bank’s primordial merits and societal support are lost in the 
process and, with them, the credibility and reputation it enjoys 
with the public and the government.   
  
  A bank’s confrontation with Brussels or its member countries 
could indeed go as far as the very bank’s independent status or 
its institutional structure, including the national participation 
in its governing body, being called into question. Anyone 
interested in organizational structures knows that organizations 
survive because powerful constituent alliances continue to derive 
benefit from them. This opinion aptly applies to the existence of 
the independence status in a central bank which is so much 
intertwined with local and sometime contradictory interests of 
its constituency. As commented by Goodman (1991), the 
preservation of independence calls for “successful management, 
especially knowing when to give in to political pressure and 
sustain societal support”. Success and popularity of central 
government’s economic policies would enhance the risk. Hence, the 
bank’s interest in avoiding embarrassing initiatives from member 
nations or regions, an interest that appointees themselves may 
well share. Permanent conflict-avoiding efforts by the government 
and the bank are not spared when the alternative is the 
involvement of the public opinion or the media in the solution of 
the frictions
8. To be sure, efforts to stave off conflicts put 
further limitations to the regional capacity and political 




7 C.Randall Henning, in an IMF forum on “The Euro: Ready or Not”, 10 
January, 2002.  
 
8 When conflicts become critical or too emotional, the public “play the 
role of an umpire”. (Susanne Lohmann (1993)). 
 
9 Thomas Havrilesky & Robert Schweitzer (1990): "The Fed is a 
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  And third, as pointed out in section 2, the cultural features   
surrounding the central banking functions and bureaucracy, its 
governor or president’s prestige and personality, the influence 
of the Academy and its models that contribute to the adoption of 
consensual paradigms (often as a result of political drives) - 
reinforce the identification of the bank as a main “principal” in 
the scale of values of the various agents, to whom the bank’s 
agenda is delegated. These and other elements that underpin the 
agency situation do not necessarily stem from formal conventions 
but rather from unwritten agreements that have force, such in 
social contracts and social norms that apply in many other social 
and political structures – “a pattern of behavior that is 
customary, expected and self-enforcing. Everyone conforms, 
everyone expects others to conform, and everyone wants to conform 
given that everyone else conforms” (Young (1993), cited in Drazen 
ibid, p.137).  
 
  More on this: “A currently fashionable belief is that 
independent central bankers can do no wrong. According to an 
influential tenet of modern monetary thought, a high level of 
central bank independence together with a clear focus on 
inflation would make for an efficient conduct of monetary policy. 
Arguably, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the most independent 
central bank in the world. Moreover, the ECB’s mandate prescribes 
price stability as its primary objective” (Bibow (2002)) – a kind 
of opinion that may not be absent from the bank’s professional 
and social environment and that enhance its principal’s role.  
 
  Inertia, culture, mystique of central banking are also 
elements of the subordinated links of appointees to the 
institution they serve. As Karl Brunner said: Central Banking 
[has been] traditionally surrounded by a peculiar and protective 
political mystique.... The mystique thrives on a pervasive 
impression that Central Banking is an esoteric art.  Access to 
this art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated 
elite.  The esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an 
inherent impossibility to articulate its insights in explicit and 
intelligible words and sentences (Alan S. Blinder (1998)). 
 
  I would venture that peripheral appointees, irrespective of 
their origins and political colors, could well be numbed by the 
central bank’s sort of institutional culture and the weight of 
traditions. Assertive, individual actions, already repressed by a 
blurred accountability and confusing and contradictory messages 
from home, may be further diluted by the dignified and 
sophisticated intellectual and political prestige of the 
 
its constituencies in the financial-services sector are made more 
beneficial, more advantageous to it, when Fomc members do not 
dissent... The manifestations of such disutility range from the mere 
discomfort in interactions with colleagues to alienation from the 
Fomc."  
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institution they serve. Their initial political commitments to 
the home constituency and the underlying political interests to 
which they are tributary run the risk to gradually give way to 
the pure fascination of central banking and its models – and 
often the mighty stature of its presidents (section 2). The 
bank’s institutional settings are no more subordinated to the 
policy impact of its commitment framework, but rather the other 
way out – if the American Federal Reserve System and the 
Bundesbank serve as precedents from which conclusions may be 
drawn.  
 
  Greider (1987) commented that when exceptionally a female, 
liberal Keynesian economist (Nancy Teeters), was appointed to the 
Federal Reserve Board, “she felt membership in a special club. 
‘At a dinner party in 1978, she recalled, (Board President) 
Arthur Burns was talking to me, asking me questions and it 
sounded like a job interview. I said ‘Arthur, you don’t want 
someone like me on the Board of Governors with my liberal 
background.’ Arthur said, ‘Don’t worry, Nancy. Within six months, 
you will think just like a central banker’. Arthur was right. I 
think I’m very much a central banker now. You’re in a position 
where your views on money, credit and banking are not really a 
reflection of your political party or your positions on economic 
issues. It’s not really a political job. I understand the whole 
milieu of what we are doing, the continuous decisions, the 
mystique of central banking.” 
 
  A reasonable assumption (difficult to check with reliable 
empirical data) is that no peripheral appointee will feel totally 
immune to the mystical attraction Mrs. Teeters spoke about. 
Lohmann (1998) shows that attraction of this nature and internal 
peer group pressures can only drive the appointee to a further 
depolitization and de-regionalization of his/her role and to a 
larger empathy with the interests, philosophy and milieu of the 
Bank and the pressures to which it is submitted. Commitments and 
mandated inflation/unemployment preferences of his/her home 
territory are likely to progressively fade away.  
 
  In the U.S. context, a utility-maximizing model developed by 
Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) captures well by implication the 
potential conflict confronted by a peripheral appointee, between 
his/her loyalty to the home territory preferences and the 
stiffening effects of dissenting from the majority of Council’s 
peers. In that model, the utility of a dissent voting is 
determined by moral values and convictions (one could here 
integrate the home mandated message and preferences), but the 
utility diminishes rapidly for reasons relating to career-
proximity to central government. The disutility of dissent, on 
the other hand, stems from an open pressure to “close ranks” (see 
later) and the threat of punishment by the System. “The 
manifestations of such disutility range from the mere discomfort 
in interactions with colleagues to alienation from the committee, National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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loss of self-esteem, and perceived erosion of future career 
opportunity sets.”  
 
  Something of this kind may apply to the ECB’s context. 
Dissenting by a member in its boardroom may be taken as an 
evidence of excessive or egoistic ambitions, of little respect 
for cooperation. This is believed to be particularly damaging to 
the career of potential dissenters. Beyond the mere attraction of 
financial and career rewards, incentives for social and 
professional approval may also contribute to an aversion to 
dissenting from peers’ general positions (Fehr and Falk,(2002))
10. 
It may also be interpreted as a sign of dysfunction of some kind 
and thus bring about a negative reaction of (forward looking) 
financial markets. In any case, dissents will aggravate decision-
making difficulties “which typically favour the status quo”, with 
debilitating effects over “the main task of a central bank – 
taking difficult decisions at the right time” (Baldwin, Berglöf, 
Giavazzi, Widgren (2000)). 
  
  More on Central Banking culture: Group pressure from peers at 
the governing bodies and encouragement to free riding; 
"consensual expectations" emerging from the central bank's 
mystique and inertia. The central bank’s personality, prestige, 
interests and political role may repress individual initiatives 
of Council members. Inertia could also be a major inhibiting 
determinant (particularly if it rests on a historical successful 
path).  
 
Schumpeter’s (1942) words come inevitably to mind: “Things 
economic and social move by their own momentum and the 
ensuing situations compel individuals and groups to behave 
in certain ways whatever they may wish to do - not indeed 
by destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the 
choosing mentalities and by narrowing the list of 
possibilities from which to choose” – which closely 
translates 17
th century Spinoza’s aphorism: “Tout être tend 
à preserver dans son être”.  
 
 
(iii) One agent, two principals. 
 
  A number of features present in regional involvement in 
national central banking are potentially present in the EMU 
context. A common factor of both regional and national models is 
a dual principal/agent or “common agency”, or “role conflict” 
issue that the appointee is bound to confront. Recognition of 
national central banks as “dual institutions, national in certain 
respects, federal in other respects”, (Padoa-Schioppa, one of its 
 
10 An aversion to dissent is implicitly recognised by Adam Smith in the 
“Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759) where he wrote: “We are pleased to 
think that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of 
approbation, … and we are mortified to reflect that we have justly 
merited the blame of those we live with.” (Cited in Fehr and Falk, 
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Council members) suggests a similar duality for the national 
governors. Monticelli (1999) has well captured the duality: 
 
 “Monetary-policy making in a collegiate body involves a 
different type of incentives. For each of the participants 
in the decision-making process pursues his objectives under 
the constraints stemming from the strategic interaction not 
only with the private sector, as in standard analyses, but 
also vis-à-vis his colleagues in the competent board. In 
the case of a monetary union consisting of several 
countries that retain political and economic sovereignty 
while relinquishing monetary powers, members of the board 
may entertain objectives with reference to the country they 
represent or come from, notwithstanding the provisions of 
the Statute of the ECB that assign only Union-wide 
objectives to monetary policy”.  
 
  Rogoff’s ideal “conservative” central bankers, which is 
considered by many as a condition for collective well-being, 
become in this way a blurred or misleading concept. One may ask: 
“conservative” under whose influences and interests? “Well-being” 
when and for whom? At one time or another, territorial appointees 
are expected to make decisions to accommodate irreconcilable or 
different time horizon preferences of either principal - 
preferences which are further obscured by imperfect and 
asymmetric information on monetary issues and outcomes.  
 
  The exacting rules that have been set for the ECB are liable 
to aggravate the clash between the bank’s objectives and national 
interests. As Wyplosz (2001) has pointed out, the 0-2% inflation 
target set by the ECB corresponds to a range which may raise the 
natural unemployment rate. This rate should rise by some 2 to 4 
percentage points in about the middle of the ECB’s inflation 
target range. In order to significantly reduce the effect, the 
ECB ought to aim at an inflation rate of more than 5%, a rate 
clearly beyond the current range of acceptability. (The author, 
however, warns the reader to keep in mind that his is a 
preliminary study, calling for more work, and that the results 
presented here would be open to considerable caution). 
 
  The U.S. experience sheds an interesting light on the 
ambiguities of the inputs that district bank presidents 
(peripheral appointees to the FOMC) are committed to deliver at 
the monetary committee. Available information implies that 
district central bankers, when casting their votes at the FOMC, 
are sensitive to specific territorial problems, as assessed by 
their local business and financial community and political 
institutions, as well to the commitments and objectives laid down 
in the Federal Reserve structures. It also suggests, however, 
that when latent divergences exist between the center and the 
territorial periphery (the two principals) they are likely to 
weaken the principals’ respective power of incentives to their 
common agent. In between the two principals, the appointees’ 
accountability to each of them is expected to thin further - an National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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intuition formally corroborated in accepted models of the “common 
agency” issue.  
 
  In 2000, the district Federal Reserve Banks provided the 
following responses to a request from the Financial Markets 
Center (2002) for: “a description of the process that the Bank’s 
board of directors employs to discuss and vote on discount rate 
recommendations
11. Please include an explanation of the role 
played by the Bank’s branch bank boards in formulating discount 
rate recommendations. Also, please explain to what extent the 
Bank’s president takes the board’s discount rate recommendation 
into account when participating in discussions and/or votes on 
policy directives at Open Market Committee meetings.” Most of the 
responses coincided in signaling a distinctive independence from 
either the district and the bank’s agenda – and an assertion of 
personal views and perceptions. (Additional information is 
included in note 
12). 
 
  It could be expected from the peculiar Fed’s structure that 
discount rates (proposed by the district banks) would parallel 
the federal funds rate adjustments (that their presidents vote at 
the FOMC), as both use the same set of analytical reference 
points and seek similar overall objectives. But the votes and 
requests do not always follow this pattern. Indeed, in comparing 
the FOMC actions of Reserve Bank presidents and the discount rate 
requests submitted by their Banks from 1993 to the present, the 
Financial Markets Center found that Bank presidents’ FOMC votes 
frequently deviate from the policy advice reflected in discount 
rate recommendations.
 12  (More information in note 
13) 
 
  On a theoretical side, a general conclusion of models with 
multiple principals corroborate indeed that the power of 
incentives to control the agent are very much weakened, sometimes 
dramatically so. (Bernheim and Whinston (1986); A.Dixit (1996)). 
The effect of asymmetric or incomplete information between 
principal and agent yields an equilibrium characterized by 
inefficiency relative to a situation of full information. The 
political constraint on policymaking is that the policy must have 
the support of the political authority to make decisions. The 
principals not only choose to delegate decisions to an agent, but 
 
11 Discount rates, the rate for bank borrowing at the Fed’s discount 
window, remains an important part of the Fed’s overall policy dynamic 
although it no longer plays a major role in implementing monetary 
policy like that of the federal funds rate which serves as the 
targeting mechanism for open market operations. Every two weeks, by 
law, directors at each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks submit to the 
Board of Governors a recommendation – initiated by their Bank president 
– to adjust or maintain the discount rate. 
 
12 Unfortunately, there is no European equivalent of the Beige Book that 
conveys a description of economic conditions in the twelve Federal 
Reserve districts in the U.S. and which can then be contrasted with the 
positions of their presidents at the FOMC.  
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must support the choices he/she makes, which may significantly 
affect the policies that can be carried out relative to what is 
socially optimal.  
 
  As pointed out in Woolley (1984), “When many actors are trying 
to shape the behavior of a given organization, none of them may 
succeed in dominating its behavior. Thus, in terms of the 
definition of [the central bank’s] independence previously 
offered, behavior might be observed that differs from that 
preferred by a given actor, but it would not be clear whether 
that difference reflected the refusal of the organization to 
comply or was instead an organizational response to preferences 
expressed more effectively by others”. Moreover, while the 
appointee’s action and performances are hardly punishable by 
removal from office or absence of reelection at the end of the 
term – mainly because of the political and credibility costs this 
would entail - larger action may be expected from the appointee’s 
own personal preferences, whether they stem from opportunistic 
(the appointee’s objective being to remain in office) or to 
partisan (or to implement a specific program) motivations (Drazen 
(2000, p.220)). In either case, common agency models predict that 
the partial delegation of duties stemming from the existence of 
two or more principals allows the principals to hinder the 
appointee from adopting policy measures they dislike, at the risk 
of causing the appointee to distort the information transmitted 
to his/her principals (see note 
14).  
 
  This paper assumes that both the home country and the bank 
will have the incentives to influence decisions of their common 
agent (the appointee). However, they are both involved in the 
monetary decision process in a variety of ways and mechanisms, so 
that their reliance on the agent’s decisions and delegation of 
duties to them is only limited. A plausible conclusion from the 
organizational context and the “common agency” issue in which the 
appointee is embedded is that his/her social, political and 
education backgrounds will be given more prominence in voting 
styles and patterns than that recognized in the current 
literature on monetary policymaking - where, at most, a simple 
principal/agent relationship with national governments is 
acknowledged. As Gildea (1990) pointed out, in the particular 
case of the appointees’ preferences for more expansionary 
policies as a reaction to increases in unemployment, these 
preferences stem generally from his/her own social backgrounds, 
career variables and other personal features more than other 
determinants and commitments. Tests on expansionary preferences 
show that it has manifested itself in FOMC’s members with 
substantial experience in private industry or government service. 
Conversely, “an Ivy League education, a Ph.D. in economics, and 
being a Federal Reserve Bank president tended to describe those 
FOMC members who voted more conservatively over their tenure” (my 
underlining). (On dissenting votes at FOMC see note 
15).  
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  There are enough similarities with the European context to 
make a reasonable guess that personal views on optimal policy, 
its time frame, particularly in respect of a possible trade-off 
between unemployment and output, political and intellectual 
outlook, professional skills (the very factors implicated in the 
agency problem between the national central banker and his/her 
home country) are also potentially interfering in the 
relationships with the ECB. In addition, irrespective of the 
weights the policymakers’ principals put on targets, other 
factors may also bear upon them  - recent analysis show that they 
gradually shift their policy outlook towards more concern to 
inflation according to his/her time left in office and not how 
long he/she has served or what he/she has already done (Sibert 
(2001)). On more general terms, the ability of the agent to take 
action affecting the principal, the fact that those actions might 
not be observed by the principal, that the principal is unable to 
prove breach of contract, are meant to be present in the 
relationships between the bank and the appointee. Vote trading 
and free riding practices, are examples of how these conditions 
can be brought to reality when the opportunity arises. 
 
  A “free rider” situation, in particular, has often confronted 
the unfettered expression of individual opinions. Goodfriend 
(1999), who knows well the U.S. system from the inside, has 
warned that the influence of regional representatives is small so 
that they may be inclined to free-ride on the preparations of 
others more interested, expert, or responsible for monetary 
policy, such as, in the U.S., the Chairman and the Board staff – 
and I would add the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The free 
rider problem is dangerous because it is hard to detect as free 
riders can continue to participate with thoughtful-sounding 
statements. “Widespread free riding would weaken the Committee in 
much the same way as the tendency to think alike”. Goodfriend 
points also to similar pitfalls of the negotiating process on 
account of the bonding that takes place as a consequence of 
repeated meetings that can cause Committee members to begin to 
think alike
13. “As a result, the FOMC could be blindsided by a 





13 Commenting on this issue, Professor Thomas Mayer intimates that much 
might depend on where the peripheral appointees are located. If their 
offices are at the ECB offices in Frankfurt they are less likely to be 
influenced by regional conditions than if they work out of their 
national central banks. He rightly asserts that “Who you have lunch 
with does matter”.  
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An improbable conclusion 
 
  Is there any conclusion from the above information that could 
apply to a multinational central banking like the European 
institution? Probably not – and this was not the intention. This 
paper concentrates on a set of institutional, personal, social 
experiences, having been driven by conjunctural factors in a 
national central banking context. This context points to a 
situation where a group of monetary policymakers are involved in 
a “common agency” issue and where the weights put on their 
decisions by either of the two principals are not uniform. These 
circumstantial features and the absence of information on 
individual positions at the Council’s room explain the failure 
(so far) of my intent to elaborate or make use of any existing 
formal model.  
 
  If the appointees’ behaviour and voting patterns hinged only 
upon structural and institutional factors, any parallel on their 
possible behaviour between the national central banking systems 
and a multinational one like ECB would clearly be farfetched. 
Political, social, institutional features are just not the same 
in a national and a supranational framework. All the same, the 
arguments developed in this paper refer to a territorial system 
of representation in independent monetary policymaking that has a 
parallel of sorts in the European framework - territorial 
appointees in both cases are confronted to two principals and are 
driven by similar considerations over monetary policy and its 
distributive outcome.  
 
  Within these strict analytical limitations, some reasonable 
speculations emerge. It is expected that policymakers split into 
two categories: the “activists” (those for whom monetary policy 
is not only more important in their home countries than in their 
counterparts’ but also those representing countries with higher 
weight in political, financial, economic terms) and the “free 
riders” (for whom economic and financial interaction with more 
important countries makes their monetary preferences closely 
dependent on the latter’s). Beyond this consideration, the 
appointees’ personal political and social backgrounds, 
convictions, and preferences are likely to be given larger 
prominence or even prevail over the two principals’ respective 
agendas. 
 
  Further empirical or theoretical speculations on that subject 
should not neglect this aspect of policymaking. To predict the 
European governors’ behavior in light of precedents in national 
central banking systems has not been the aim of this paper. The 
aim is rather to anticipate a “role conflict”, whose ingredients 
are parallel to a large extent in the national and multinational 
peculiar context of interests, political and social environment 
involved in monetary policymaking - and to outline its possible 
outcome.  National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
Draft Fall 2002 
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1 The term “core executives” encompass the whole structure 
of national political power and its connecting links with 
the economy and public media, in the interpretation of 
Robert Elgie and Helen Thompson (1998). 
 
2 Rogoff (1985) suggests that, in the presence of market 
distortions, an independent and inflation-averse central 
banker reduces average inflation although increases output 
variability; the conservative central banker reduces the 
inflation bias, due to the time-inconsistency problem, but 
stabilizes less.  
 
3 In a formal treatment of the interaction between 
Euroland’s national macroeconomic players and the ECB 
Council, Grüner (1999) proposes two alternative assumptions 
on the behaviour of members of the ECB council: (i) they 
all are concerned about Euroland's macroeconomic aggregates 
and (ii) they are mainly concerned about their individual 
domestic macroeconomic conditions. A more realistic 
assumption, i.e. members accountable to a dual constituency 
with distinct preferences and commitments of their own, is 
not considered in Grüner’s paper. 
Another recent noteworthy paper (Fatum (2002)) argues that 
a decision making mechanism based on the median voter 
theorem (which imply the council members being equally 
split between those preferring a more inflation averse 
policy and those with less inflation averse preferences) is 
too restrictive for capturing important aspects of monetary 
policy in the European Monetary Union, particularly because 
intensity of preferences cannot play a role when only the 
median voter matters. Replacing the median voter mechanism 
by a less restrictive “weighted mean mechanism” (which 
captures the individual voting weight (or influence) of 
member states and the monetary policy choice associated 
with their appointees, the author predicts that strategic 
delegation would lead to a single monetary policy set in 
accordance with the preferences of the most inflation-
averse member state. This finding provides theoretical 
support for the perception of the European Central Bank 
implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than the 
policy of an average union-wide central bank.  
 
4 Alesina and Grilli, 1992, asked whether the voting 
mechanism described in the ECB draft statutes would lead to 
a policy that reflects the preferences of European voters. 
They found a problem that is common to ‘district’ systems. 
Using the results of the last general elections in the 
twelve EC countries, Alesina and Grilli found that the 
median European voter was currently well to the left of the 
median of the European Council. They go on to argue that 
the appointment and voting procedures described in the 
draft statute of the ECB would result in a monetary policy 
that could be very different from the preferences of the 
median European voter. 
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5 The Barro-Gordon’s social loss function assumes that 
central government has incentives to manipulate the money 
supply and boost in this way its popularity, particularly 
in election periods
5. Though the government is aware that 
anticipated inflation will have no significant positive 
effect on equilibrium economic activity in the long run, 
time-inconsistent
5 arguments suggest why it nonetheless 
resorts to inflate to induce such an effect in the short 
run. Models developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988)
5, with 
further additions by Fratianni, vonHagen, Waller, (1997))
5 
also contend that the government knows that the optimum 
monetary policy entails some short-term sacrifices that 
could harm its popularity and electoral outcome. The 
outcome of next elections are assumed to be dictated by 
people’s expectations over the level of output and how it 
compares with that expected from the challenger(s). 
Negative output variations may result from distinct and 
random causes, like a given political mind-set, exogenous 
shocks, or other developments, without the constituency 
being able to identify their true nature and impact. The 
asymmetry of information may then result in the incumbent 
being, rightly or wrongly, held responsible for their 
negative results in well-being. To the extend therefore 
that external factors obscure the real outcome of the 
incumbent’s program and be detrimental to his/her 
reputation and electoral success, the incumbent has an 
incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary 
monetary policy and get in this way an advantage over the 
challenger(s).  
It is important to note that, for some authors, the Barro-
Gordon model and its variants like that referred to in this 
text bear little resemblance to the process of monetary 
policy in the US and many other countries. Empirical data 
does not consistently confirm the hypothesis of monetary 
manipulation. See among others Alan Blinder (1998) and 
W.D.Nordhaus (1975). 
 
6 Drazen views on this subject are indirectly related to 
the literature on central bank as a scapegoat or whipping 
boy for incumbent politicians. Woolley (1984) contends that 
“It is in effect a tacit conspiracy to discourage 
congressional participation in the monetary policy game, 
and it allows the president the opportunity to use the Fed 
as a scapegoat. At the same time, Congress welcomes the 
fact that there is an "independent" Fed that can be blamed 
for economic difficulties.”  
According to Edward J.Kane (1990) “Fed policy-makers and 
elected politicians are repeatedly playing a game against 
each other. In playing this game, the Fed's objectives are 
to improve the performance of the national economy and to 
improve the agency's standing as a public enterprise. 
Politicians engage in Fed bashing to make sure that these 
two objectives come into conflict when they either want a 
change in current policy or want to avoid blame for 
previous policy moves that have turned out to be unpopular. 
In this way, Fed personnel are made to face difficult 
trade-offs.... Each player knows how to calculate the 
benefits and costs that attend its various potential moves, National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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as well as what would constitute the best response to each 
move by opposing player... In exchange for playing 
economic-policy scapegoat, Fed officials are offered 
unusually long terms in office and substantial budgetary 
autonomy. This duality and ambiguity of function are 
paralleled in the very language of the Fed Act, which sets 
up a uniquely confusing bureaucratic structure that makes 
the Fed appear both 'independent' of short-run political 
influence and decentralized in its internal 
organization...”  
"What you do in this world is a matter of no consequence. 
The question is, what can you make people believe that you 
have done?" 
 
7 In Germany, the German Federal President appoints the 
president of the Bundesbank upon nomination made by the 
government, which has in turn been agreed among the leaders 
of the coalition parties (in practice, the president has 
always deferred the nomination to the government). 
Appointments are for eight years, but terms are renewable: 
the typical length of service for Council members has been 
almost 13 years. In France, no official nomination 
procedure is mandated, although it is largely accepted that 
the appointment of the head of the Banque de France is the 
result of a joint decision by the Finance Minister, the 
Prime Minister, and the President of the Republic.  
Countries where central banks were still under direct 
responsibility of the government (especially Belgium, 
France, and Spain) were encouraged by the specific 
obligations of the Maastricht Treaty to increase the formal 
autonomy of their respective central banks. Practically in 
all Euro zone countries this formal independence has been 
now achieved. This is formally the case for nine of the 
twelve governors in the ECB Council, and may be considered 
the informal rule for the rest of them, usually for terms 
of five to seven years (an exception is Italy, whose 
governor is appointed “for life”, i.e. up to the retirement 
age).
7 However, while recognizing that all these banks 
exhibit a greater degree of independence than under the 
previous regime, it is also generally accepted that they 
still remain vulnerable to government pressure.  
As to the ECB, members of the Executive Board will be 
appointed for eight-year non-renewable terms by common 
accord of the governments of the member states at the level 
of heads of state or government, at the recommendation of 
ECOFIN, after consultation with the European Parliament and 
the Governing Council of the ECB (European Communities 
1992, Article 109a). The appointment of the national 
central bank governor is subject to Treaty stipulations 
that the term of office of a governor shall be no less than 
five years. No term can therefore be shorter than electoral 
cycles for national legislatures in any member state. Any 
national governor who is dismissed will have the right of 
appeal to the European Court of Justice (European 
Communities 1992, Article 14). However, peers and 
professional media and their opinions over the performance 
of the appointee may make up for the absence of the 
appointment privileges that the bank is deprived.   National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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8 “There are various aspirants to the role”, says Woolley. 
“Congress has a firm legal claim to be the final authority 
on the Federal Reserve's existence. It is clear that the 
System is not formally answerable to the president, whereas 
it is formally answerable to the Congress. However, the 
president is charged by law with responsibility for 
macroeconomic policy, and the Federal Reserve is obviously 
important in this realm. Moreover, it is the president who 
appoints top officials... Economists also claim some right 
to be considered as arbitrers of the Federal Reserve 
behaviour. Economists claim to speak for the public 
interest, and they claim the right to evaluate the 
technical competence of the Federal Reserve. ... Bankers 
form the Feds natural constituency and have been closely 
linked with the Federal Reserve since its founding. Bankers 
play a direct role in shaping economic performance and may 
thereby claim a special capacity to evaluate the 
appropriateness of Federal Reserve actions. Perhaps bankers 
are the most likely of all these groups to be the superior. 
... Bankers certainly have the command of technical, 
financial, and political resources that would be necessary 
for a nongovernmental group to influence policy. On the 
other hand, it is not clear that the financial industry is 
able to unite behind any clear short-term policy 
recommendation except in extreme economic conditions. 
However, if bankers are not able to function effectively as 
superiors in the short term, they may be able to help 
create an atmosphere at the Federal Reserve that is not 
open to other interest groups.” 
 
  
9 Gildea (1992) carried out a test of a possible regional 
bias in the voting behavior of District Federal Reserve 
Bank’s presidents. Three separate models (district, state, 
local) were tested using probit analysis. Explanatory 
variables in each model included the ratio of an area’s 
unemployment rate relative to the national rate, as well as 
other variables, such as the ratio of an area’s percentage 
of Democratic voters to the national percentage regional 
for the most recent presidential election. The result was 
that all of the coefficients in all of the models are of 
the expected sign and significant at the 10 percent level 
or above, with a few minor exceptions. In particular, an 
increase in the local unemployment rate relative to the 
national rate or an increase in the percentage of local 
residents voting for a Democratic candidate in the last 
presidential election relative to the national average are 
seen to increase the probability of a Federal Reserve Bank 
president (a regional appointee) voting for more-
expansionary policy. Other models were tested which 
confirmed the influence of local data on presidents’ voting 
behavior. 
Other opinions concur. Periods of economic slump in the US 
coincide with increased inter-state divergence of 
unemployment rates, implying a deterioration of local 
conditions relative to average levels (section 1). As it 
could be expected, this has also coincided with increased National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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divergent views among FOMC members, and a corresponding 
increase of dissenting votes. Number of dissents at FOMC 
meetings, which normally amount to two or three, climbed to 
five in 1982 (a year when unemployment increased by 2.2 
percent and growth decreased by 2.6 percent). Dissents 
amounted to four in two opportunities, a most probable 
consequence of unexpected low growth in 1990 (0.8 percent) 
and in 1991 (minus 0.3 percent).  
Ellen Meade and Nathan Sheets (1999) have put together 
cross-sectional variance of state unemployment (percentage 
points) and FOMC dissents (number). The result exhibits the 
expected positive relationship between the dispersion of 
state unemployment rates and the number of dissents at FOMC 
meetings. The authors warned however that while dissents 
rose with the increase of cross-section variance in the 
1982-1983 period, the evidence does not appear to be 
overwhelming. “Furthermore, this analysis does not take 
into account the direction of the dissent (that is, whether 
the dissents registered were consistent with the 
unemployment data in the region).  
A more recent analysis (Meade and Sheets (2002)) bears out 
the opinion of regional representatives being more 
responsive to regional economic conditions and their 
choices affecting monetary policy and overall economic 
performance than spurious correlations may suggest. Their 
analysis of the difference between the regional and 
national unemployment rate for each Federal Reserve area 
and for each month of an FOMC vote lends some support to 
the view that regional unemployment differentials did 
influence voting behaviour of the regional appointees. 
“Over the sample period, Bank presidents dissented for 
tighter policy when the national unemployment was 0.4 
percentage point above the region’s rate. … In addition, 
Bank presidents dissented in favour of tighter policy with 
9.9 percent probability when the unemployment rate in their 
region was below the national average, but only 5.2 percent 
of the time when the unemployment rate in their region was 
above the national average. Differentials in unemployment 
rates, however, do not seem to help explain the observed 
pattern of dissents by Bank presidents in favour of easier 
policy”.  
 Bernhard and Chang (1999) include data on FOMC voting by 
district representatives and centrally appointed (Board of 
Governors) members at every meeting, together with district 
economic data, from 1958 to 1994. Variables chosen captured 
major aspects of the economy that the FOMC members are 
meant to care about (gross product as a measure of output, 
income as a measure of the standard of living, wages as a 
measure of inflation, and unemployment). In the income 
equation, all coefficients were significant at the level of 
at least 0.85. In the wages equation, all coefficients were 
significant at the 0.95 level. Most of the coefficients 
were in the expected direction - the higher the output or 
wages, the tighter the policy. These results support the 
traditional view that FOMC members respond most strongly to 
output and inflation. However, the authors admit that “the 
results for the gross product and unemployment equations 
are not as convincing. Many of the variables are not National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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significant nor are the directions of the coefficients 
always as expected. All of the models are fairly good at 
predicting the direction of the vote with at least 62 
percent correctly predicted ex post”.  
Second, the authors test a possible difference between 
voting by district and by centrally appointed 
representatives. A discernible difference was found in the 
way that the former respond to the national conditions 
compared to their former colleagues. "There is both 
evidence that they respond differently from the BOG members 
with respect to the national conditions and that they are 
indeed sensitive to their own districts, conditions. What 
are the reasons for these different responses?  Due to the 
structure of the district banks, the bank presidents are 
subject to different constituencies from the BOG members.  
The BOG members are ultimately responsible to the President 
and Congress - the principals who appoint them.  The bank 
presidents are responsible to their respective boards of 
directors which are composed of three sets of constituents 
- banking interests, other business interests, and BOG 
members.  The first two would be more interested in local 
conditions than national conditions since the former may 
affect, their businesses more.  If we reasonably assume 
that bank presidents are interested in re-election to their 
positions, then it is not surprising that they would 
respond to district conditions." 
 
10 Vote trading suggests a repeated game model with 
reputational considerations. For an analysis based on 
cooperative game theory see Buchanan and Tullock (1962). 
See also Carlo Monticelli (1999) on strategic interaction 
for the allocation of the stabilization benefits from the 
conduct of the single monetary policy. His analysis 
underlines the importance of the selection of the 
procedures governing proposal making and voting at the 
ECB’s Council, left open by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
11 Some basic facts:  
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
the FOMC, at the top of the American system, consists of 
seven governors, each serving a 14-year term. “The 
governors are generally appointed from among the ranks of 
private bankers and economists, with some attention given 
to regional balance within the board” (emphasis added).  
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal 
Reserve principal monetary policy making unit, comprises 
the seven governors, plus the presidents of the twelve 
Reserve Banks that spread over the national territory. 
However, while all of district presidents attend FOMC 
meetings and participate in policy discussions, the voting 
members are restricted to five votes. The President of the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank has permanent voting status 
while the heads of the Cleveland and Chicago banks vote in 
alternating years. The remaining three FOMC votes rotate 
annually among the presidents of the other nine Reserve 
Banks.  
The FOMC is charged under law with overseeing open market 
operations, as they influence the amount of reserves National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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available to depository institutions, in addition to 
setting ranges for the growth of monetary aggregates and 
directing operations undertaken by the Federal Reserve in 
foreign exchange markets. Reserves are the principal tool 
of monetary policy as they are meant to determine nominal 
and real interest rates and financial flows – bearing upon 
price and employment levels (at the core of the Federal 
Reserve mandated objectives).  
The regional presence in monetary decisions provides the 
bank with specific information from the various 
participating regions, an information which is meant to be 
a central input to the formulation of policy
11. And not only 
information “facilitates surveillance of the economy” but 
also it helps “a central bank to communicate with the 
public”. At the same time, “the Chairman (President) of the 
system should be strong enough to encourage diverse views 
in the monetary policy committee and to build a consensus 
for decisive and timely policy actions as needed” says 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Marvin Goodfriend 
(1999). “The regional presence helps a central bank to get 
its policy message out and to gather anecdotal and 
specialized information on regional economies. Information 
gathering and dissemination are particularly important for 
central bank such as the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve 
System, whose currency areas span large and populous 
regions…”. The value of local information that Reserve Bank 
presidents bring to the Federal Open Market Committee and 
the advantage in getting them involved in conveying the 
Fed’s message out to the public is a much highlighted 
issue. A “delegation of duties” by the central bank to its 
regional component is thus clearly established.  
FOMC allegedly maintains a “collegial atmosphere … 
cloistered from the normal tempests of politics”. Governor 
Edward Kelley has still recently insisted: “There is a long 
tradition here - that is in my experience scrupulously 
observed - that there is no politically partisan component 
that interjects itself into the work of this central bank. 
We all either arrive with or very quickly adopt the 
viewpoint that our sole and only constituent is the 
American people and their economy. You will never be able 
to identify a partisan consideration in the discussions 
around this building”. (“The Region”, September 1999. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). 
The American appointment system of district central bankers 
is indeed at arm’s length with party affiliations – and to 
territorial or home district particular concerns as well.  
The by-laws of the FOMC explicitly exclude that the 
appointee be instructed by their banks or serve as their 
representatives. It remains, however, that “The view that 
district presidents (i.e. potential FOMC members with 
voting rights) are independent of political considerations 
is shown to be naïve, which helps explain why board 
governors and bank presidents do, in fact, act so much 
alike” (Tootell (1996).  The author found a statistically 
significant difference in the voting constants of FOMC 
members with different political heritage; the probability 
of a Democrat voting to tighten is lower than that for a 
Republican. Note also that the majority of district National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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presidents are Republican, irrespective of whether they are 
sent by a Democrat-controlled or by a Republican-controlled 
State or District.  
 
 
12 An emblematic response would be that given by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston: “The discussion on the discount 
rate recommendations (is) one of many factors taken into 
consideration by the President in formulating her views on 
monetary policy”. 
Other District Federal Reserve Banks expressed similar 
opinions in slightly different formulations: their 
presidents listen to their directors, whose opinions 
probably influence the discussions that will take care in 
Washington, but the final decisions are solely theirs. Some 
excerpts:  
“The Bank's Board of Directors discusses and votes on 
discount recommendations in alphabetical order. The Bank's 
President takes into account the Board's discount 
recommendations as well as other relevant economic data”. 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York). 
“Directors receive a briefing on current economic and 
financial conditions from the research staff. Directors 
then share their own observations, experiences, and 
perspectives on the state of the economy. Next they hear a 
recommendation on the discount rate from the Bank 
president, and they discuss that. Then they vote on a 
discount rate action. The directors' discussions pursuant 
to a discount rate decision are among the inputs our 
president may consider when he is discussing or voting on 
an FOMC action”. (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). 
 “After the go-round at the Richmond board of directors 
meeting, the president summarizes the national economic 
situation and makes a recommendation on the discount rate 
for the board to consider. Board members discuss the issue 
among themselves and with the bank president. In light of 
the president's recommendation and the following 
discussion, a vote is taken on the discount rate …. The 
bank president's participation in the discussion and votes 
on policy at FOMC meetings are fully independent of the 
Bank's board of directors”. (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond). 
 “The views of the directors with respect to the discount 
rate, as well as their views with respect to current 
business and economic conditions, are an important part of 
the information President Hoenig takes into consideration 
when he participates in FOMC meetings”. (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City).  
“Following discussion and motion for action, the directors 
vote on a discount rate recommendation to the Board of 
Governors. At the in-person meetings, the representatives 
from each branch, who are invited to each of these 
meetings, are welcome to participate in the discussions, 
but they do not vote. When participating in discussions 
and/or votes on policy directives at the FOMC the president 
is expected to exercise his or her own best judgment. 
Although he is not obligated to carry forward the directors 
discount rate recommendations to the FOMC processes, he National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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does give due consideration to the directors views on 
economic and credit conditions within our region and on 
national and international economic and credit developments 
viewed from their various vantage points”. (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas). 
“The information provided by the directors at board 
meetings is one source of information for the Bank's 
president in his preparation for FOMC meetings. In 
addition, a few weeks before each FOMC meeting, the 
directors (and the Twelfth District Advisory Council 
members) receive a questionnaire on the economy and on 
specific subjects being studied by the Bank's Research 
Department. This information is the basis of the Twelfth 
District's part of the Beige Book which is presented to all 
Reserve Bank presidents and the Board of Governors before 
each FOMC meeting. The Board of Governors' Research staff 
also prepares information which includes its views and 
input from other central banks, various government 
departments, and other key sources. Once a president is at 
an FOMC meeting, s/he also is receiving the views of the 
other eleven Districts. Each president and governor must 
vote from a national perspective without regard to the 
needs of one District or economic sector over another, and 
the FOMC's policy position is drawn from the consensus. The 
directors' views are a part of this complex collaboration 
and are valued for their closeness to and familiarity with 
the "grassroots" of the economy”. (Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco). 
 
13 As pointed out by the Financial Markets Center, nearly 
one fifth (68 of 355) of FOMC votes cast by Reserve Bank 
presidents since 1993 have differed in kind or degree from 
the discount rate recommendations submitted by their boards 
of directors in the period immediately prior to Open Market 
Committee meetings. In many instances, these divergences 
underscore the Fed’s commitment to preserving consensus on 
Open Market Committee decisions and Reserve Bank 
presidents’ corresponding desire to maintain their 
influence within the Committee rather than diluting that 
influence by dissenting from the majority. In some cases, 
the divergences may indicate a president’s failure to 
persuade the Reserve Bank’s board of directors to tailor a 
discount rate request comparable to his or her upcoming 
FOMC vote. 
According to Federal Reserve rules, discount rate requests 
are not binding on a Reserve Bank president’s FOMC vote (an 
appendix to this report contains Reserve Bank responses to 
a Financial Markets Center survey examining the role of 
discount rate recommendations on Bank presidents’ actions 
at the FOMC). Indeed, on a few occasions, Reserve Bank 
presidents have cast FOMC votes that ran counter to both 
their Bank’s discount rate recommendation and the Committee 
majority. 
 
14 A model by Anthony M.Marino and John G.Matsusaka (1999) 
investigates the economics of several decision processes 
that are commonly used to set budgets in both the public 
and private sector. The key tradeoff is that partial National appointments to multinational monetary policymaking: A role conflict?  
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delegation allows the principal to reject those projects he 
dislikes, but causes the agent to distort the information 
he transmits to the principal. See USC CLEO Research Paper 
No. C01-21, August 2001. 
 
15  Dissenting votes at FOMC are attributed to 
“identification to strongly held doctrinal perspectives”, 
rather than to the influence of some kind of “principal” to 
the regional appointees.  According to the Financial 
Markets Center (op.cit.), “On January 29, [2002] four 
Federal Reserve Bank presidents will rotate into voting 
positions on the policymaking Federal Open Market Committee 
… With the exception of Philadelphia Fed President Anthony 
Santomero, who is getting his first chance to vote on the 
FOMC after taking the Third District Bank’s reins in 2000, 
each of the new voters has distinguished himself in past 
rotations by his dissents from FOMC majorities. … Since 
1993, these three Bank presidents – Jerry Jordan (Cleveland 
Fed, monetarism), Gary Stern (Minneapolis Fed, rational 
expectations) and Robert McTeer (Dallas Fed, new economy 
optimism) – have accounted for half of all dissenting votes 
on FOMC policy actions. Thus, over the course of 2001, 
analysis of FOMC decisions will focus in part on the 
interplay between these individuals and their FOMC 
colleagues in setting the central bank’s benchmark federal 
funds rate”. 
 
 